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Abstract
In many firms, incentivized salespeople with private information about their customers are
responsible for customer relationship management (CRM). Private information can help the firm by
increasing sales efficiency, but it can also hurt the firm if salespeople use it to maximize own
compensation at the expense of the firm. Specifically, we consider two negative outcomes due to
private information —ex-ante customer adverse selection at the time of acquisition and ex-post
customer moral hazard after acquisition. This paper investigates potential positive and negative
responses of a salesforce to managerial levers--multidimensional incentives for acquisition and
retention performance and job transfers that affect the level of private information.

Salespeople are responsible for managing customer relationships and compensated through
multidimensional performance incentives for customer acquisition and maintenance at many firms.
This paper investigates how a salesperson’s private information on customers affect their response
to multiple dimensions of incentives. Using unique matched panel data that links individual
salesperson performance metrics with customer level loans and repayments from a microfinance
bank, we find that sales people indeed possess private information that is not available to the firm.
Salespeople use the private information to engage in adverse selection of customers in response to
acquisition incentives. Customer maintenance incentives serve a dual purpose; they not only reduce
loan defaults, but also moderate adverse selection in customer acquisition. Transfers that eliminate
private information reduces the adverse selection effects of acquisition incentives, but increase loan
defaults—customer moral hazard. Despite the potential negative adverse selection effects due to
private information, the effort increasing effect of each of the three dimensions of sales management
we investigate---acquisition incentive, maintenance incentive and transfers all have a net positive
1
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effect on firm value. Methodologically, the paper introduces an identification strategy to separate
customer adverse selection and customer moral hazard (loan repayment), by leveraging the
multidimensional incentives of an intermediary (salesperson) responsible for both customer selection
and repayment with private information about customers.
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1 Introduction
Firms increasingly recognize the value of customer relationship management (CRM). CRM
recognizes that although acquiring customers is important, maintaining customer relationships—
and ongoing revenue streams--is even more critical for profitability (Jain and Singh 2002, Li, Sun
and Montgomery 2011, Shin and Sudhir 2010, Reinartz, Krafft and Hoyer 2004, Venkatesan and
Kumar 2004). In many B2C markets, salaried marketers are responsible for the CRM functions of
acquiring customers and maintaining customer revenues using a centralized customer database; the
academic marketing literature on customer management has generally focused on such settings
(Gupta and Lehmann 2005, Venkatesan and Kumar 2004). But in many B2B markets and even B2C
markets such as financial services in which high customer-level profit margins support ongoing
personal selling, incentive-driven salespeople develop and manage customer relationships.1
When using incentive-driven salespeople for customer management in B2B markets, two issues
arise that have received little attention in the B2C literature on CRM. First, the extant literature
on sales incentives is typically based on unidimensional measures of performance, typically sales
revenues (e.g., Chung, Steenburgh and Sudhir 2014; Misra and Nair 2011). But such single
dimensional compensation plans are inadequate for CRM as they do not decompose performance in
terms of sales generated from newly acquired customers and profit generated through maintaining
relationships with existing customers.

Hence incentives are tied to multidimensional—acquisition

and maintenance—performance of the sales person. Second, salespeople can have private information
on customers through their relationships with customers. Private information can increase a
salesperson’s efficiency and thus help the firm, but it can also hurt the firm if salespeople use it to
maximize own compensation at the expense of the firm. Specifically, we consider two negative effects
due to private information that can negate the productivity enhancing effects of incentives: ex-ante
customer adverse selection at the time of acquisition and ex-post customer moral hazard after
acquisition.

1

Interestingly, the best-selling CRM software is salesforce.com, which started as sales automation software and primarily
serves as a tool for salespeople to manage customer relationships.
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This paper investigates how salespeople responsible for customer management respond to
multidimensional performance incentives relevant for CRM, in the presence of private information
about customers. Specifically, we study the salespeople’s response to three levers that impact
incentives and private information and commonly used to manage a salesforce responsible for CRM:
(1) acquisition incentives (2) maintenance incentives and (3) job transfers that affect the level of
private information.
We outline the managerial tradeoffs involved in the use of these levers. While acquisition
incentives enhance productivity by motivating salespeople to bring in more customers, in the
presence of private information, it may motivate salespeople to selectively target easier-to-acquire,
poorer-quality customers with lower lifetime value (adverse selection).2 Maintenance incentives can
not only improve customer maintenance and reduce customer moral hazard ex-post, but also
incentivizes forward looking sales people to ex-ante not acquire lower quality customers (mitigate
adverse selection). This is because maintenance incentives give salespeople a stake in the future cash
flows from customer; making them consider the potentially negative consequences for their own
future incentives from acquiring lower quality customers. Periodic job relocation or rotation can
reduce the potentially negative effect of private information by eliminating private information.3
But relocation eliminates not only the negative adverse selection effects of private information but
also the efficiency enhancing effects. Whether salesperson relocation is profitable for the company
is therefore an empirical question.4

2

The issue of adverse selection in response to sales incentives has received much attention in the popular press in the
context of the subprime mortgage crisis. Loan officers in banks were accused of approving mortgages to customers with
less than stellar credit, by disguising their lack of credit worthiness in formal applications in order to receive loan
acquisition bonuses (reference and/or quote) as they were not responsible for subsequent performance. The issue of adverse
selection is also critical in other marketing settings where firms invest substantially in customer acquisition and hope to
recover the benefits of their investments over the life of the relationship. If salesperson knowingly acquire customers who
are likely to stop doing business relatively soon after being acquired and before the acquisition costs have been recouped,
such acquisitions can destroy firm value, rather than adding to firm value.
3
Transferring employees is a common practice in the banking and B2B finance sector. For example, France, Germany,
Italy and the United States, for example, mandate rotation of audit partners across clients. Also see discussion in Fisman,
Parvasini and Vig (2011) on mandated transfers in the Indian state banking sector.
4
Firms typically do not have levers either contractually or through incentives to appropriate this asset from the
salesperson so that the firm can take advantage of the efficiency enhancing effects and avoiding the adverse selection

2

Given the background of the tradeoffs involved, the papers addresses the following research
questions: (1) is there evidence of private information among salespeople? (2) do acquisition
incentives lead to adverse selection? (3) do maintenance incentives mitigate adverse selection? (4)
do transfers mitigate customer adverse selection, but increase moral hazard? (5) do the
acquisition/maintenance incentives and transfers overall have a net positive or negative effect on
firm profitability?
Answering these questions pose a number of challenges. First, one needs matched panel data
on sales force incentives/performance and customer relationships over time. This is typically difficult
to obtain, as such data tend to reside separately within different functions of a firm. Specifically,
the sales incentive and performance data reside within human resource/sales functions within a firm,
whereas detailed customer panel data reside within the marketing function. We were fortunate to
work with a microfinance bank in Mexico that lends to small business customers and was willing to
match the panel data on performance/compensation/transfer information about their loan officers
(salespeople) with the loan acquisition and repayment behavior of their customers.
Second, detecting evidence of private information is typically challenging due to its intrinsic
unobservability. Our primary identification strategy leverages the idea that salesforce performance
and incentives should not directly affect consumer repayment behavior but only indirectly through
salespeople’s efforts. Specifically, correlation between compensation performance and borrower
repayment behavior conditional on credit rating, loan characteristics and various unobserved demand
shifters is driven by private information held by salespeople about customers. In other words, if
there is no private information for salespeople beyond what the company knows, then there should
be no systematic relationship between salespeople’s incentive state and repayment behavior because
a salesperson compensation status is not observable to borrowers.
Finally, beyond the unobservability of private information, it is generally not feasible to observe
exogenous changes in private information. In our empirical setting, the microfinance bank randomly
effects. For instance, although firms encourage salespeople to input information about the status of their ongoing
conversations with prospects and stage of conversion in CRM tools such as salesforce.com, salespeople are reluctant to
part with this information, which they view as their own assets for which they receive no rewards for sharing with the
firm.
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transferred their salespeople—the loan officers. The bank chose a randomized transfer strategy when
loan officers cannot predict the likelihood of their transfers so that loan officers may not indulge in
relationship harvesting bad behavior as the likelihood of transfer increases, because they will not be
as responsible for the consequences of the bad behavior. Thus in our setting transfers serve as an
exogenous instrument for how changes in private information affect responses to incentives.
Our key findings are as follows: Overall, we demonstrate that private information is a relevant
issue — salespeople indeed possess private information about customers not available to the firm.
In response to customer acquisition incentives, salespeople indeed “abuse” the private information
to engage in adverse customer selection—acquiring customers that controlling for observables known
to the firm have lower expected profits. Customer maintenance incentives serve a dual positive
purpose for the firm; they not only reduce ex-post loan defaults (customer moral hazard), but also
moderate ex-ante adverse selection in customer acquisition. Private information has both positive
and negative effects. When firms eliminate private information through job location transfers, it
reduces adverse selection in response to acquisition incentives, but also increases loan defaults
(customer moral hazard). But overall, the net effect of transfers is positive. Importantly, without
the pressure of maintenance incentives, the positive effect of customer acquisition incentives will be
neutralized by the negative effect of adverse selection through reduced customer quality at the
margin.
The paper contributes to multiple literatures in marketing and economics. Substantively, the
paper extends the literature on CRM and sales force compensation. First it extends the CRM
literature (e.g., Venkatesan and Kumar 2004), which has abstracted away from the role of an
incentivized sales force to obtain desired customer management outcomes—an issue that is
particularly important in B2B settings. In particular, the paper highlights the challenge of private
information among salespeople in incentivizing the salesforce as it can have both positive and
negative effects.
Second, it expands the empirical literature on sales force compensation to move beyond a
unidimensional performance measure (e.g., Misra and Nair 2011; Chung, Steenburgh and Sudhir
2014) to consider multidimensional performance benchmarks and address the multi-tasking agency
4

problem highlighted by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) so that the salesforce balance their efforts
across multiple dimensions. The issue of course is critical in B2B CRM settings. In our particular
application, this balance is not just in allocating effort on two contemporaneous performance
dimensions, but in addressing the right balance between short-run and long-run performance. In so
doing, it addresses the challenges associated with limited liability of agents (e.g., Sappington 1983,
Oyer 2000, Simester and Zhang 2014). Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) leading to a focus on shortrun performance by combining “short-run” acquisition incentives with “longer-run” maintenance
incentives. Customer maintenance incentives are a way of providing an ongoing stake in the
“customer asset” for the salesperson and a means of aligning incentives between salespeople and the
firm through an effective “partial ownership” (Grossman and Hart 1983).
Methodologically, this study contributes to a growing literature that empirically tests for the
existence of private information and distinguishes the effects of customer adverse selection and moral
hazard in insurance and credit markets. Identifying the existence of private information and
quantifying its effect are challenging because of its intrinsic unobservability. Previous studies address
this problem by obtaining access to additional information unused by a firm (Finkelstein and
McGarry 2006, Finkelstein and Poterba 2004). Moreover, by only observing customer behaviors ex
post, researchers cannot disentangle the source from adverse selection ex ante and moral hazard of
them ex post.5

Past studies address the issue through a randomized controlled experiment with

contract terms (Karlan and Zinman 2009) or by exploiting policy changes (Dobbie and Skiba 2013).
We introduce a new identification strategy that exploits “supply-side” variation in the salespeople’s
motivation to use private information at the point of customer acquisition and maintenance and a
policy that explicitly changes the level of private information about customers to separate customer
adverse selection and customer moral hazard.

5

A positive correlation test proposed in Chiappori and Salanie (2000) explores the evidence of asymmetric information
but does not separate adverse selection and moral hazard. For example, even when an insurance company finds a positive
correlation between the plan coverage and the number of claims, it cannot fully attribute this finding to adverse selection
(i.e., high-risk consumers opt into generous plans) or moral hazard (i.e., those who enroll in generous plans tend to become
involved in risky actions).

5

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces institutional details and the
data. Section 3 explains our empirical strategy and results and discusses the key findings. Section 4
assesses the robustness of the key results. We conclude and provide future research direction in
Section 5.

2 Institutional Details and Data
We begin with a description of the institutional details of our empirical setting and describe
the data used in our empirical analysis.

2.1 Institutional Details
Our empirical application is in the context of a Microfinance Institution (MFI) in Mexico
that lends to low income, small business entrepreneurs through loan officers (salespeople) without
collateral. The loans offered are typically small (median of $690), high interest rate (median rate is
85%), short maturity (median length is 6 months) and high delinquency probability (average of
about 25.4%), as is common for microcredit in emerging markets.6
The loan officers have two main responsibilities: acquiring new loans and ensuring
repayments on existing loans. The acquisition stage involves recruiting borrowers through referrals
and database searches, accepting loan applications and recommending loan terms to the bank. Banks
use public information about the borrower available to the bank and information in the loan
application to generate a five point credit rating for each borrower. This is used to both approve
the loan and set the interest rate. Given acquisition, officers ensure that loans are repaid on time
(e.g., through phone calls and in-person visits).

During this process, loan officers can obtain private

information about clients’ motives, financial capabilities/liabilities and build relational capital. Our
interest lies in how loan officers use this private information to enhance their incomes—either

6

See, e.g., Sengupta and Aubuchon (2008) for more discussion on microcredit loans in emerging markets.
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through increased efficiency in customer acquisition and maintenance that are also beneficial to the
firm or through adverse customer selection, which hurts the firm.7
The firm offers a salary and a bonus that is a multidimensional function of both acquisition
and customer maintenance performance. Acquisition performance is benchmarked against one’s own
past performance to create an index of performance (

for officer j at period t). The maintenance

performance index is based on the number and value of loans collected relative to the loans
outstanding (

). The salespeople’s bonus is the product of the acquisition index, maintenance

); thus, receiving zero points in any

index and their base salary (i.e.,

category would earn them no bonus at all. Note that the multiplicative feature of the incentive
scheme leads officers to balance effort between acquisition and maintenance in any given time period.
Further, the multi-dimensionality of the compensation plan introduces a dynamic trade-off for the
salesperson: between the immediate benefits of acquiring lower quality customers to improve
acquisition performance, and its future negative effect on maintenance performance.
Finally, the bank periodically relocates loan officers from their current branch to another
branch.8 A particularly interesting characteristic of the transfer policy at the MFI is that the
transfers both in terms of timing and location are entirely random. The randomness in timing is
intended to prevent loan officers from engaging in greater adverse selection, when their expectations
of transfer are high. We check that the transfer policy is indeed random and exogenous with respect
to officers’ characteristic, previous performances and geographical region, as conceived by the firm.
Fortunately, for our econometric analysis, this means we can treat transfers as an exogenous shock
to salesperson private information and do not need to account for endogeneity concerns.

2.2 Data

7

Although our data allow us to study repayment behavior within a loan, we lack sufficiently long panel data to study
customer maintenance and repayment behavior across loans. In this paper, we treat repayment within the loan as
corresponding to maintenance.
8
Such transfers are common in the banking sector to avoid potential abuse of the private information by loan officers to
avoid adverse selection. (Hertzberg, Liberti and Paravisini 2010, Fisman, Paravisini and Vig 2011).
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Our panel data include monthly salesforce performance and compensation data matched with
the transactions on loans generated and maintained by the salesperson. We observe 461 loan officers
working on 129,839 loans for 14 months from January 2009 to February 2010. The loan data include
information on loan characteristics such as the borrower’s credit rating, loan terms (e.g., amount,
interest, origination date and loan duration) and details of loan repayment (e.g., monthly payments,
delinquency). The loans are also matched with the loan officer who generated the sale, and the loan
officer currently maintaining the loan (which is typically the originating officer, except when there
is a transfer). For each loan officer, we have monthly information on the points on the acquisition
and maintenance benchmarks, based on which the bonus is computed.
We report summary statistics of loan characteristics and bonus points in Table 1. The average
loan size is 9,192 pesos (approximately 690 US$ in 2009), with an average loan term of 6 months.
The average interest rate as is typical in many emerging market for loans without collateral is high
at 87%.

The high interest rate reflects both a high overall delinquency rate of approximately 25.4%

and the very high cost of acquiring and collecting loans.9 The average of monthly acquisition points
(A) is 0.75 and maintenance points (M) is 0.85 across the salesforce and across time; and the average
of the overall bonus multiplier (A*M) is 0.59 of the salary. 10 More details on the marginal
distributions of loan characteristics and points are presented in the Appendix.
Next, we report on the relationship between bank’s credit rating of borrowers and loan
performance. The bank’s rating of borrowers is shared with the loan officers who sell the loan and
the loan underwriters, who approve the terms of the loan. Figure 1 shows that the delinquency
probability falls and Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of a loan11 improves as the credit rating goes
up indicating that the credit rating is a reliable predictor of borrower quality and the loan’s risk

9

Approximately 56% of the loans are not repaid on time at least once.
We observe officers’ base salary only in the last period for 273 officers. They earn 4050 Mexican pesos (313 USD) as
base salary on average, with a standard deviation of 1650 pesos. Base salaries are determined by seniority, not by
performance.
11
We compute IRR of each loan based on loan size and returned amount over time. Our data do not include exact cash
inflow; thus, we make the following assumption on the returned amount: a borrower decides to make zero repayment in
the delinquent period and make full repayment in other periods. A loan officer cannot collect any amount from the period
in which the loan defaults.
10
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and performance. Table 2 further explores the relationship between credit rating and loan
characteristics. 71% of the loans are given to those with credit ratings of 5, 18% to those with credit
ratings of 4. Only 11% of loans are given to those with credit ratings of 3 and below. The interest
rates are roughly the same across credit ratings, though the standard deviations are high. i.e., the
bank does not seem to increase the interest rate to compensate for its greater risk. Instead, duration
of the loan is greater for those with lower credit ratings, this may be the bank’s attempt to make it
feasible for borrowers with lower incomes to help pay back the loan.
Figure 2 shows that 33.4% of officers went through a transfer, and 3.2% did so more than once
during the observation window. We check that the transfer policy is indeed random and exogenous
as conceived by the firm. Table 3 reports the results of a logistic regression with transfer as a
dependent variable, and observable officer characteristics as explanatory variables. Transfer is not
related to any of the officers’ characteristics, such as tenure, the number of months since their
previous transfer, gender, or previous period performance, confirming the firm’s description of the
implementation of the transfer policy.12
[Insert Table 1, Figure 1, Table 2, Table 3]

3 Empirical Analysis
We begin with a discussion of our identification strategy and then outline the steps of our
empirical analysis to answer the research questions we raise in the paper.

3.1 Identification Strategy
Given that a salesperson’s private information is inherently unobservable, it is challenging to
demonstrate the presence of private information, and identify the effects of such private information
on salespeople’s performance outcomes. As we allude to in the introduction, there are two key ideas
in our identification strategy to detect salesperson private information, customer adverse selection

12

We also find that the transfer decision is not correlated with officers’ past performances up to 3 months before transfers,
or other officer characteristics, such as education level, marital status, relationship type (Canales and Greenberg 2015) or
position in the firm.
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and customer moral hazard. The first is that a salesperson’s motivation to use the private
information, if available, to achieve acquisition and retention performance benchmarks varies over
time as a function of observable to researchers “states” of the salesperson. If the loans offered by a
salesperson during periods their motivation to engage in adverse selection is greatest perform worse
(controlling for observables available to both salesperson and the firm), we treat that as evidence
for both sales person private information and customer adverse selection. Similarly, if the probability
of repayment (customer moral hazard) changes as a function of the pressure to achieve maintenance
benchmarks (after controlling for observables), that is evidence of salesperson private information
and customer moral hazard. The key identification assumption is that the sales person incentive
states and motivations are orthogonal to customer and loan characteristics because customers do
not observe officer incentive states.
Second, the random transfer policy of the MFI provides us another exogenous “supply” variation
in the level of private information among salespeople on their customers. By relocating loan officers
to new branches and forcing them to acquire and maintain new customers, the MFI renders the
salespeople’s private information from established customer relationships useless for performance.
Comparing the continuing officers’ customer acquisition and retention performance outcomes against
transferred officers’ performance outcomes helps us identify the effect of private information on
customer adverse selection and moral hazard. Again, the key identification assumption is that the
transfer policy creates a supply-side variation that is not correlated with demand-side factors, such
as customer and loan characteristics.

3.2 Empirical Strategy
Our empirical analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we examine selection effects on the quality
of loans originated due to acquisition incentives, retention incentives and job rotation. This allows
us to test for both the existence of private information and how the three managerial levers impact
adverse selection. Second, we examine ex-post consumer moral hazard after loan origination i.e.,
repayment/delinquency behavior in response to the three levers. Finally, we examine the overall
effects of the three levers on firm profitability; i.e., we test whether the effort e.
10

3.2.1 Ex-Ante Selection Effects when Originating Loans
We begin with a test for whether the performance of a loan is a function of the acquisition,
maintenance and transfer states of the officer at the time of origination of the loan by estimating
the following empirical model.
(1)
, the internal rate of return of loan

In equation (1), we measure loan performance through

i, originated by officer j at time o. The variables representing incentive states are Acquisition index
at o,

.13 The dummy variable

, the Maintenance index at o-1, denoted by

equals 1 if officer j was new to the branch at origination period. The model also controls for
observable loan characteristics in

, such as borrower’s credit rating, loan amount, duration,

interest rate and the number of months since origination. Furthermore, the model includes loan
officer fixed effects and time fixed effects to capture any unobserved heterogeneity of loan officers
and market shocks such as competition against other banks or macroeconomic financial shock.14
The coefficients we are primarily interested in are

,

and

. The coefficients

and

in equation (1) represent how IRR of each loan changes in response to sales force incentives at
acquisition period o, conditional on observables and salesperson/period fixed effects. Controlling for
observables, salespeople can use their private information to go after “easier to acquire” loans with
lower IRR.

Negative

implies that as the salesperson’s performance on the acquisition increases

in the period, IRR of the loans fall, indicating adverse selection. Negative

13

We construct demeaned variables

and

implies that adverse

to eliminate any effect of cross-sectional unobservables. The

demeaned variables measure how well or badly each officer performs, relative to her own average performance. The
demeaned Acquisition points are computed as

, where

is the number of periods that officer j

appears during the observation window. While acquisition points are considered for time period o, based on the acquisition
at period o, which is controlled by the loan officer. For maintenance, we consider the index from o-1, which indicates the
level of pressure for ensuring repayment in period o. However, the actual maintenance index in period 0 is not realized
until after the end of the period, and is not entirely under the loan officer’s control.
14
In this specification, we abstract away from potential concerns of endogeneity of loan terms X, but will revisit the
robustness of our conclusions to potential endogeneity of loan terms in Section 4.
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selection is moderated by the maintenance incentive and that officers are forward-looking, i.e.,
officers under high maintenance pressure (i.e., those who showed poor maintenance performances at
o-1) screen out unprofitable borrowers at o to prevent higher delinquency risk in the future (which
would further worsen their maintenance metric) and therefore acquire higher IRR loans, controlling
for observables. The coefficient

shows the effect of the transfer policy. A positive

shows that

transferred officers acquire better loans than do continuing officers, suggesting that salespeople with
little private information (relational capital) are likely to engage less in adverse selection.
Table 4 reports the results. In Model 1, a one-point increase in acquisition performance relative
to the loan officer’s average leads to 0.54% decrease in IRR of new loans. A one-point decrease in
the previous period’s retention performance, which generates motivation to earn retention points,
leads to a 1.07% increase in IRR of new loans. Transferred officers, whose private information is
eliminated, bring in higher-quality loans at 2% of IRR. This shows evidence of private information
among the salesforce, that higher acquisition performance accentuates adverse selection, and
maintenance pressure mitigates adverse selection and transfers mitgate adverse selection.15
Model 2 adds the interaction term between two incentive components, and Model 3 includes
quadratic terms of demeaned incentives to capture potential nonlinearities. The results above remain
robust; all of the specifications support the hypothesis that the marginal quality of the loan suffers
due to the loan officers’ use of private information to accept risky borrowers.
Coefficients of other variables exhibit the expected direction. As observable credit rating
increases, IRR goes up. Smaller loan, longer duration and higher interest rate are associated with
lower profitability.
[Insert Table 4]
3.2.2 Ex-post Customer Moral Hazard
Next, we investigate how the acquisition/maintenance incentives and transfers impact
customer moral hazard, i.e., repayment behavior or delinquency.

15

Given private information, loan

The results remain consistent when we measure loan performance through 1) the number of late repayments, 2) the
probability of late repayments and 3) the failure to collect a loan on time at least twice during the loan cycle.
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officers can increase monitoring to reduce customer’s moral hazard on repayment especially when
they are under high maintenance pressure. However, transferred officers without private information
may perform worse on this dimension as they have less information on where to focus their
monitoring effort. As there is a balance between time spent on acquisition and maintenance, higher
customer acquisition may be related to greater delinquency.
(3)

In equation (3), Delinquency ijt is the dummy for delinquency of loan i at time t belonging
to officer j. The model separately examines the effects on loans that are already delinquent at the
end of t-1, which is represented by the indicator.16 We believe sales people will have greater impact
on loans that are not already delinquent, and therefore sales incentives will have greater impact on
such loans. The model also controls for loan characteristics and officer and period fixed effects.
The main coefficients of interest are coefficients concerning maintenance points, which
primarily incentivizes ensuring repayments on loans. A positive
high maintenance pressure (i.e., low
repayment behavior at t. A positive

shows that salespeople under

) increase monitoring intensity to improve borrowers’
indicates the removal of private information due to transfer

at t causes increases delinquencies; suggesting that private information and the relational capital
with the borrowers does help in ensuring repayment and that they are able to target the efforts on
the right borrowers. We expect

to be negative as loan officers are likely to be less effective on

getting repayments of already bad loans relative to loans in good standing, even with maintenance
incentives.
The estimates are reported in Table 6. Model 1 has only retention incentives as the incentive
pressure at t, Model 2 has both acquisition and retention incentives, Model 3 adds the interaction
of the two components, and Models 4 and 5 do not differentiate between high-quality and low-

16

We check the robustness of results with other definitions of the variable (e.g., delinquency for 2 or 3 consecutive periods,
delinquency for more than 10% of time up to period t-1).
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quality loans. The coefficient of

is positive and significant in Models 1, 2 and 3, indicating

that retention pressure improves monitoring and reduces delay of good loans. Specifically, a oneunit increase in retention points in period t-1 (which decreases retention pressure in period t), leads
to a 2% increase in the delinquency probability of loans in period t among loans in good standing
at t-1. Across Models 1-3, the coefficient of

is consistently positive and significant,

indicating that that the elimination of private information about customers from salespeople through
transfers hurts loan repayment by 0.4%. Interestingly acquisition effort and maintenance effort are
not substitutes; the negative coefficient of

in Model 2 indicates that acquisition and retention

performance are complementary. Officers expanding their acquisition effort for new loans also have
better maintenance performance. This is of course due to multiplicative nature of the acquisition
and repayments performance on incentives.
A large effect of

suggests that loans that are already delinquent are more likely to

remain so. Thus, under high retention pressure, officers are less likely to monitor such low-quality
loans and more likely to focus on the loans in good standing. The negative coefficient of
suggests that low-quality loans receive less monitoring and ultimately become
delinquent under high retention pressure. Transfer has little effect on bad loans, because continuing
salespeople do not exert sufficient efforts to maintain the borrowers.
[Insert Table 5]
3.2.3 Total Profits of Loans Generated by Salesperson
Next we test whether the net effect of the acquisition, maintenance and transfer levers is
positive or negative across loans generated by a salesperson over the month. This allows us to test
whether the sales-enhancing effect of the managerial levers of incentives demonstrated in the existing
literature (e.g., Chung, Steenburgh and Sudhir 2014) and transfers exceeds the the negative adverse
selection effect due to the private information on marginal loans. To investigate the question, our
analysis is now salespeople-month level rather than at the loan-level. In particular, we run the
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following model in equation (2), where we test whether the total NPV of the loans generated by
salesperson j at period o is positively or negatively affected by the three levers.
(2)
The dependent variable

represents the sum of the net present value of new loans

acquired by officer j at period o. The coefficients

,

and

show the effect of incentive

components on the overall quality of loans originated by officer j. The coefficient

shows the

effect of the transfer decision at the point of origination on profits generated by salesperson j.
Table 5 reports the regression results. Model 1 is the baseline case and the estimates show
,

, and

and the effects are statistically significant. This shows that each of the

levers considered contribute positively to firm profits. However we need to consider the interaction
between acquisition and maintenance states to understand how these incentives jointly affect
profitability. Model 2 adds the interaction term between acquisition points and retention states, and
Model 3 adds squared terms of the incentive states to capture potential nonlinearities.
We represent the interaction effects estimated in Model 2 in Figure 3. When the salesperson is
under high maintenance pressure (i.e., those whose previous-period maintenance points are 0.5 point
below their average points), greater acquisition performance leads to a sharp increase in profits, but
when the maintenance pressure is low (0.5 point above their average points), an increase in
acquisition points lead to very little increase in profits. Thus in the absence of maintenance pressure,
salespeople engage in significant adverse selection which effectively neutralizes all the profits from
customer acquisition. In effect, the firm is paying out commissions with little gains in profitability.
This shows that without the use of maintenance metrics of performance that penalizes for ex-post
delinquency, salespeople will resort to significant adverse selection that destroys firm profitability.
[Insert Table 6 and Figure 2]

3.3 Managerial Implications
Our findings have large managerial implications concerning salesforce management. First, our
results imply that delegating the CRM function to sales agents and implementing performance15

based incentives can be complementary, as theoretically shown by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994).
We find that delegating CRM functions to sales agents can be more profitable when they effectively
utilize accumulated relational capital (i.e., private information). A carefully designed performancebased incentive scheme prevents sales agents from taking advantage of the information to shirk, and
the company can benefit from the relational capital. In other words, our results indicate that a
performance-based incentive scheme can enhance the benefits of relational capital.
Second, related to the first point, multi-dimensional incentive plans, which reward both
customer acquisition and retention, are useful to utilize relational capital effectively when sales
agents directly manage the customer relationship. The traditional unidimensional incentive plan, as
studied in the existing papers, does not effectively motivate salespeople to value the long-term profit
that each customer generates. In contrast, splitting acquisition bonus and retention bonus forces
sales agents to consider not only short-term profits but also long-term profits. We demonstrate that
sales (acquisition) incentive can increase performance but intensify customer adverse selection, and
that retention incentive alleviates customer adverse selection because salespeople now consider the
effect of their current acquisition behavior on future retention performance. Hence, our work sheds
new light on the role of multi-dimensional compensation plans in CRM.
Third, our findings also suggest what managers must consider when considering job rotation.
We find that random job transfers can be used to avoid undesirable consequences of relational
capital. Because relational capital is owned by salespeople and not transferrable across them, the
firm completely shuts off unobserved or unreported information about a customer upon sales agent
rotation. Transferred salespeople, with less private information than continuing ones, are less likely
to participate in adverse selection and more likely to mismanage existing customers’ moral hazard.
Transfers have a positive net effect on overall productivity in our setting, but the effects would be
heterogeneous across industries depending upon how salespeople use their private information.
Overall, our results provide useful guidance for managers in designing salesforce management
systems, particularly when sales agents are in charge of CRM.
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4 Robustness Checks
We complement our main results with robustness checks. First, we consider whether potential
endogeneity issues in loan terms change our results concerning loan officer private information by
an instrumental variable approach. Second, we perform a falsification test of our main hypothesis
by considering continuing and transferred officers separately. Finally, we examine whether
unobserved branch-level local unobserved heterogeneity drives our results. Other robustness checks
we perform can be found in the Appendix.

4.1 Endogeneity in Loan Terms
In Section 3.2, one might be concerned with endogeneity issues of loan terms because they are
determined by both sales agents and borrowers through negotiation. Salespeople, however, consider
expected profitability of loans when deciding loan characteristics, which can lead to endogeneity in
loan terms. In this robustness check, we assess by calculating the models with instruments for loan
amount and duration.
Our instrumental variable is the average loan characteristics of other loans acquired by the same
loan officer j at period o.17 The variables affect loan characteristics of loan i, because loan size, for
example, reflects loan officer j’s overall tendency to approve large or small loans. Loan size is also a
function of negotiation between the officer and the borrower; thus, it provides a variation not fully
captured by officer fixed effects or officer’s incentive points. However, the average characteristics of
other loans should not directly affect the ex post profitability of loan i.
We report the results in Table 7. With instrumenting, IRR is now negatively correlated with
loan amount and positively with duration in Model 1. The reversed sign of coefficients verifies
endogeneity in loan terms.18 We find that the effects of our main variables interest, Acquisition point
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Our idea of instrumental variables is similar to Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), in which the authors use the
characteristics of other products as instruments to control for endogeneity of price.
18
Controlling for the selection effect, the negative coefficient of loan amount implies that those who have greater loans
are more likely to default, which is a moral hazard, whereas the remaining selection effect is positive, which implies
advantageous selection. In contrast, the moral hazard effect of duration is limited. Those loans with longer duration are
lower quality, which results in adverse selection in terms of duration.
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and Retention point become stronger once the endogeneity issue is addressed. Hence, despite loan
terms being subject to endogeneity, our main results are robust.
[Insert Table 7]

4.2 Endogeneity in branches where the officers are transferred
In Section 3, one of our key identification strategies relies on random salespeople transfers.
Although our findings in Table 3 suggest that the firm’s transfer policy is random, officers in underperforming branch are still likely to be transferred to high-performing branches or branches in good
market condition. If so, transferred officers may face a more profitable customer base in a new
branch; thus, her new loans might perform better, which has nothing to do with effects of private
information. To address this concern, we include branch fixed effects and estimate coefficients in
equations (1) and (2).
Tables 8a and 8b show that our main results remain consistent with branch fixed effects. We
add Model 1 without branch fixed effects from Tables 4 and 5 for comparison. At the acquisition
stage described in Table 8a, loan officers still become involved in adverse selection as they expand
their acquisition efforts, with a one-unit increase in acquisition state pushing up IRR by 0.4%. The
retention pressure forces officers to look forward and hold out for risky loans. The incentive states
have smaller effect in Model 2 than in Model 1, since branch-level market conditions (i.e., overall
quality of customer base in a branch) is controlled.

The coefficient of

shows that

transferred officers bring in higher quality loans than do continuing officers, even when we focus on
within-branch effects. The transfer effect is slightly higher in Model 2, suggesting that the transferred
officers bring in higher-quality customers, regardless of branch-level performances. The anticipated
performance of a branch or market conditions do not drive transfer decisions.
Table 8b documents salespeople’s monitoring behavior within a branch. While the main result
remains consistent, the incentive points have smaller effects with branch fixed effects, for both good
and bad loans. In Model 2, the effect of transfer represented by the coefficient of T ransferjt is
insignificant for good loans, and slightly positive for bad loans, indicating that transferred
18

salespeople do not effectively monitor existing loans, particularly bad loans. Without branch fixed
effects in Model 1, transferred officers are not effective in monitoring good loans. We conjecture that
this change in findings is due to

(

). The findings indicate that heterogeneity in the customer

base across branches does not drive the main results. Salespeople use their private information
regardless of the features of the population with which they interact.
[Insert Tables 8a and 8b here]

4.3

Effect of Ratcheting Incentive
We describe that the bank’s compensation scheme creates a dynamic consideration for officers,

particularly in Acquisition points (A). One may raise a concern that the incentive scheme is not free
from ratcheting effect because a loan officer’s monthly acquisition goal depends upon previous
periods’ acquisition performance.20 While salespeople put acquisition efforts to earn high Acquisition
points, they might shirk off to the extent that they fear high sales would only result in an
unachievable quota next period.
Although we cannot simulate officers’ behaviors under a counterfactual incentive scheme
without any ratcheting effect21 and observed behaviors of salespeople under ratcheting incentives
may not maximize their current utility, we believe that the ratcheting effect rather reinforces our
adverse selection claims. The ratcheting effect would reduce acquisition efforts; thus, salespeople
should engage in less-severe adverse selection. Thus, we argue that our calculations are the lower
bound of potential adverse selection of new customers.
Our idea to examine the effect of the ratcheting effect considers that salespeople would not
want to exceed the cutoff, above which their quota increases in a discrete manner, even though they

20

Loan portfolio size at the beginning of each period determines Acquisition Goal and is thus again a function of
acquisition performance in past periods.
21
We leave it for future research. The evidence would demonstrate the advantage of a ratcheting incentive in an
organization in which adverse selection is largely detrimental. A ratcheting incentive is commonly considered to hurt a
firm because it induces employees to reduce efforts. However, it also causes them to focus not only on sales but also to
balance between quantity and quality aspects. Consequently, the firm would benefit from mitigated adverse selection and
maintain a high quality customer base.
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are able to do so. We separately analyze loans generated by such high-performing officers, whose
average Acquisition performance would lead them to exceed the cutoff, and those originated by lowperformers. Although officers’ average performances, which categorize salespeople into high- and
low-performers, are already affected by ratcheting incentives, this analysis would enable us to
roughly

suggest that ratcheting incentives ameliorate the extent of adverse selection. In Table 9,

Model 1 analyzes IRR of loans originated by high performers (i.e., loan officers who would have got
higher Acquisition goal if they performed on average) and Model 2 looks into the profitability of
loans sold by low performers. We find that high-performers who should be concerned about
ratcheting incentives do not show adverse selection behaviors, while low-performers do. The
coefficients of

imply that high-performing salespeople are more likely to avoid risky decisions

under maintenance pressure. Overall, without ratcheting effect, our main result on adverse selection
may have been higher.

[Insert Table 9]

5 Conclusion
In this paper, we empirically study three key issues that arise when incentive-driven salespeople
manage customer relationships using the rich micro-level data that include both salesperson
compensation/performance data and their customer-level transaction data.
First, when salespeople are delegated CRM, they can obtain private information about
customers through interactions with customers beyond what the company can observe from hard
information in the customer database. This private information can help salespeople find and
maintain good customers, but at the same time the salespeople can also abuse the private
information by bringing in bad customers to increase their short-term payoffs.
Second, a unidimensional sales-based incentive scheme, which has been primarily examined in
the salesforce compensation literature, might not work well when salespeople are in charge of CRM,
whereas a multi-dimensional incentive scheme that rewards both customer acquisition and retention
20

can incentivize salespeople. Thus, we consider how private information about customers influences
salespeople’s behavior under a multi-dimensional incentive scheme.
Third, the company can exploit temporal job transfers or rotations as a tool to manage the
potentially negative effects of private information that salespeople could abuse. Job transfers change
salespeople’s private information and mitigate the negative effects. Different levels of transfer policies
in different industries can reflect the degree of asymmetric information that salespeople can acquire.
Our findings suggest that officers have private information about customers’ ability to repay
and that they leverage their unobserved knowledge to earn higher incentives. They accept lessdeserving borrowers to obtain high acquisition points but become conservative under retention
motives because they are afraid that low-quality loans might hurt their future retention points. At
the repayment stage, officers become involved in more monitoring to reduce borrowers’ moral hazard
if they have high retention pressure. Moreover, we find random relocation mitigates adverse customer
selection because transferred officers do not have such private information.
Our findings provide important managerial implications for CRM. When managers design a
salesforce management scheme, they must consider potential complementarity between delegation
of CRM to the salesforce and implementation of a high-powered incentive. Moreover, managers must
design incentive schemes carefully so that agents’ incentives are aligned with the company to address
not only short-term profits but also long-term profits to increase CLV. Finally, job rotation would
also influence the effectiveness of an incentive scheme because it eliminates relational capital upon
a transfer. Hence, frequency of job rotation should be carefully done together with the design of an
incentive scheme and the degree of asymmetric information in the market.
Methodologically, we employ a new strategy to identify adverse selection of customers. Our
identification strategy for the effect of private information and adverse customer selection can be
generalized to other situations to the extent that customers are not able to observe the supply-side
incentives.
This paper does not address how firms that become involved in CRM optimally design salesforce
compensation schemes. Structural models of salesforce-driven CRM behavior with multi-dimensional
incentive schemes would allow us to answer this question, but we leave it for future research.
21
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A Appendix
A.1 Details on Compensation Plan
In this section, we provide detailed structure of the compensation policy that the bank
implements. Tables A.1 and A.2 exhibit the detailed compensation policy on how Acquisition Goal,
and Retention points are determined.
[Insert Table A.1]
The Acquisition Point (A) is the amount of newly acquired loans divided by Acquisition Goal
(Table A.1.), which is a function of the loan officer’s current total loan amount lent. A loan officer
who has acquired many new loans will face a significant increase in his/her Acquisition Goal. Hence,
to the extent that he wants to avoid an unachievable high growth point target, the loan officer might
not want to increase efforts to acquire new customers. We examine this ratcheting effect in Section
4.
[Insert Table A.2]
As in Table A.2, the retention incentive has non-linear structure. Observe that this non-linear
structure does not create any ratcheting incentive for loan officers because current retention points
do not mechanically affect future retention points.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Loan Characteristics

Mean

SD

Min

Max

Amount (pesos)
Annual Interest rate (%)
Duration (months)
Delinquency (%)
Sales Force Incentives and Transfer
By SalespersonAcquisition Point (A)
period
Maintenance Point (M)
A*M
By Salesperson
No. of Transfers

9,192
87.21
6.27
25.42
Mean
0.75
0.85
0.59
0.37

8,956
8.81
3.89

700
42
1

55,000
100.29
33

SD
0.45
0.23
0.3
0.55

Min
0
0

Max
3.188
1.25

0

3

Table 2: Distribution of Loan Performance and Characteristics across Credit Rating

Credit
Rating

N

IRR

Delinquency prob

Interest rate

Duration

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

1

4,484

45.9

44.57

0.65

0.36

88.67

9.83

10.76

6.38

2

3,089

53.36

39.46

0.59

0.38

86.71

9.58

10.84

6.89

3

6,754

66.98

35.63

0.46

0.38

88.1

8.46

8.43

4.41

4

23,768

79.16

23.96

0.25

0.3

86.27

7.25

6.13

3.77

5

91,744

87.28

19.66

0.14

0.22

87.58

9.13

5.84

3.38
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Table 3: Randomness of Transfer Policy

DV
A at t-12

Model 1
Transfer
at t1
-0.251
(0.203)

Model 2
Transfer
at t

0.342
(0.387)

M at t-12

Model 3
Transfer
at t
-0.294
(0.206)
0.429
(0.406)

Model 4
Transfer
at t

Model 5
Transfer
at t

-0.00199
(0.00139)

Tenure

0.368
(0.241)

Female
Time since
Last Transfer
Intercept
Period FE
N

-2.897***
(0.304)
Yes
2,603

-3.505***
(0.452)
Yes
2,646

-3.218***
(0.439)
Yes
2,590

1
2

Model 6
Transfer
at t

-2.716***
(0.152)
No
3,224

-3.440***
(0.182)
No
1,947

0.151
(0.0957)
-4.284***
(0.486)
No
696

Model 7
Transfer
at t
-0.0195
(1.199)
-1.771
(2.916)
0.00960
(0.00850)
1.645
(1.047)
0.357
(0.282)
-6.338*
(3.493)
Yes
150

Logistic Regression (DV: Transfer, Indicator 1 if an officer is new to the branch at period t)
Models 4 and 5 include Period FE, since incentive points at different periods cannot be directly compared.
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Table 4. Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of Newly Originated Loans
Model 1
IRR
-0.537***
(0.152)
-1.070**
(0.538)

DV

1.987***
(0.216)
3.991***
(0.598)
13.33***
(0.476)
21.74***
(0.420)
26.66***
(0.404)
0.630***
(0.0790)
-0.108***
(0.0202)
0.657***
(0.00703)
-10.95***
(1.231)
Yes
89,993

Rating 2
Rating 3
Rating 4
Rating 5
Loan Amount
Duration
Interest Rate
Intercept
Salesperson, Period FE
N
***

Model 2
IRR
-0.540***
(0.152)
-1.059**
(0.538)
0.556
(1.382)

1.984***
(0.216)
3.991***
(0.598)
13.33***
(0.476)
21.74***
(0.420)
26.66***
(0.404)
0.630***
(0.0790)
-0.108***
(0.0202)
0.657***
(0.00703)
-10.97***
(1.232)
Yes
89,993

: p<0.01, **: p<0.05, *: p<0.1
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Model 3
IRR
-0.645***
(0.159)
-0.970*
(0.567)

-0.556**
(0.244)
1.037
(1.851)
1.988***
(0.216)
3.995***
(0.598)
13.33***
(0.476)
21.75***
(0.420)
26.66***
(0.404)
0.629***
(0.0790)
-0.108***
(0.0202)
0.657***
(0.00703)
-10.87***
(1.233)
Yes
89,993

Table 5. Delinquency of Existing Loans
Model 1
DV

Model 2

Model 3

Delay

Delay

Delay

0.0201***

0.0203***

0.0203***

(0.00763)
0.00448*

(0.00764)
0.00442*

(0.00778)
0.00442*

(0.00257)
0.470***

(0.00257)
0.470***

(0.00257)
0.470***

(0.00198)
-0.0954***

(0.00198)
-0.0957***

(0.00198)
-0.0957***

(0.0128)

(0.0128)

(0.0129)

-0.00403

-0.00376

-0.00377

(0.00390)

(0.00390)
-0.00440**

(0.00391)
-0.00441**

(0.00178)
0.000994

(0.00180)
0.000999

(0.00321)

(0.00322)
0.000431
(0.0169)
-0.000603

-0.00468

-0.00468

(0.0300)
-0.00468

(0.00415)
-0.0720***

(0.00415)
-0.0720***

(0.00415)
-0.0720***

(0.00351)
-0.165***

(0.00351)
-0.165***

(0.00351)
-0.165***

(0.00314)
-0.253***

(0.00315)
-0.253***

(0.00315)
-0.253***

(0.00301)
-0.00482***

(0.00301)
-0.00483***

(0.00301)
-0.00483***

(0.000718)
0.00162***
(0.000180)

(0.000718)
0.00163***
(0.000180)

(0.000718)
0.00163***
(0.000180)

Interest Rate

0.00212***
(0.0000686)

0.00212***
(0.0000686)

0.00212***
(0.0000686)

Age of Loan

0.0113***
(0.000299)

0.0113***
(0.000299)

0.0113***
(0.000299)

Salesperson, Period FE

0.126***
(0.0112)
Yes

0.126***
(0.0112)
Yes

0.126***
(0.0112)
Yes

N

278,943

278,943

278,943

Rating 2
Rating 3
Rating 4
Rating 5
Loan Amount
Duration

Intercept

***

**

*

: p<0.01, : p<0.05, : p<0.1
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Table 6:

Total NPV of Originated Loans by Salesperson by Month
Model 1

Model 2

2.390***
(0.264)
0.205
(0.924)

2.410***
(0.264)
0.000635
(0.930)
-4.403*
(2.431)

0.928***
(0.323)
4.957***
(1.885)
Yes
Yes
3,403

0.941***
(0.323)
5.058***
(1.885)
Yes
Yes
3,403

DV

Intercept
Salesperson FE
Period FE
N
***

: p<0.01, **: p<0.05, *: p<0.1
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Table 7: IRR of Newly Originated Loans
with Instrumental Variables
Model 1
IRR (IV)
-0.705***
(0.167)
-0.984*
(0.567)
1.795***
(0.232)
5.473***
(0.735)
18.48***
(1.445)
29.81***
(2.191)
34.83***
(2.213)
-2.962***
(0.967)
1.820***
(0.518)
0.598***
(0.0176)
-20.42***
(2.839)
Yes
Yes

DV

Rating 2
Rating 3
Rating 4
Rating 5
Loan Amount
Duration
Interest Rate
Intercept
Salesperson
FE
Period FE
N

89,860
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Table 8a: IRR of New Loans with Branch FE

DV

Rating 2
Rating 3
Rating 4
Rating 5
Loan Amount
Duration
Interest Rate
Intercept
Salesperson FE
Period FE
Branch FE
N

Model 1*
IRR

Model 2
IRR

-0.537***
(0.152)
-1.070**
(0.538)
1.987***
(0.216)
3.991***
(0.598)
13.33***
(0.476)
21.74***
(0.420)
26.66***
(0.404)
0.630***
(0.0790)
-0.108***
(0.0202)
0.657***
(0.00703)
-10.95***
(1.231)
Yes
Yes
No
89,993

-0.396**
(0.158)
-0.969*
(0.572)
2.177***
(0.230)
3.863***
(0.609)
13.02***
(0.484)
21.23***
(0.427)
26.09***
(0.411)
0.619***
(0.0800)
-0.0923***
(0.0205)
0.662***
(0.00711)
-8.615***
(2.593)
Yes
Yes
Yes

*Model 1 in Table 4
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86,886

Table 8b: Delinquency of Existing Loans with Branch FE
Model 1*
Delinquency
0.0203***
°
R
j ,t 1
(0.00764)
0.00442*
T ransferjt
(0.00257)
0.470***
B adi ,t 1
(0.00198)
-0.0957***
°
Badi ,t 1 * R
j , t 1
(0.0128)
Badi ,t 1 * T ransf -0.00376
(0.00390)
-0.00440**
A² G jt
(0.00178)
0.000994
Badi ,t 1 * A² G jt
(0.00321)
-0.00468
Rating 2
(0.00415)
-0.0720***
Rating 3
(0.00351)
-0.165***
Rating 4
(0.00315)
-0.253***
Rating 5
(0.00301)
-0.00483***
Loan Amount
(0.000718)
0.00163***
Duration
(0.000180)
0.00212***
Interest Rate
(0.0000686)
0.0113***
Age of Loan
(0.000299)
0.126***
Intercept
(0.0112)
Salesperson FE
Yes
Period FE
Yes
Branch FE
No
N
278,943
DV

Model 2
Delinquency
0.0193**
(0.00789)
-0.00454
(0.00425)
0.470***
(0.00197)
-0.0888***
(0.0132)
0.0229***
(0.00674)
-0.00503***
(0.00182)
0.00288
(0.00334)
-0.00554
(0.00418)
-0.0730***
(0.00354)
-0.166***
(0.00317)
-0.255***
(0.00303)
-0.00478***
(0.000725)
0.00159***
(0.000181)
0.00213***
(0.0000692)
0.0111***
(0.000301)
0.181***
(0.0509)
Yes
Yes
Yes
274,907

*Model 2 in Table 5
***

: p<0.01, **: p<0.05, *: p<0.1
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Table 9. Effect of Ratcheting Incentives

DV

Rating 2
Rating 3
Rating 4
Rating 5
Loan Amount
Duration
Interest Rate
Intercept
Salesperson
FE
Period FE
N

Model 1
High*
IRR
0.690
(1.966)
-8.032**
(3.908)
2.595
(1.811)
-8.485**
(3.755)
2.026
(2.800)
7.381***
(2.405)
11.31***
(2.247)
-0.622
(0.588)
-1.378***
(0.138)
0.418***
(0.0514)
30.32***
(6.149)

Model 2
Low*
IRR
-0.542***
(0.150)
-0.896*
(0.539)
1.966***
(0.215)
4.698***
(0.602)
14.03***
(0.481)
22.56***
(0.425)
27.54***
(0.409)
0.666***
(0.0789)
-0.0520**
(0.0203)
0.667***
(0.00703)
-12.68***
(1.220)

Yes

Yes

Yes
3,414

Yes
86,579

*High (performers): Those whose Acquisition goal would have increased, if they performed on average.
***

: p<0.01, **: p<0.05, *: p<0.1
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Table A.1: Compensation Plan – Acquisition Goal25
Initial Portfolio Size
0 – 500,000
500,001 - 1,000,000
1,000,001 – 1,500,000
1,500,001 – 2,000,000
2,000,000 – 2,500,000
2,500,001 -

Jan 2009 – Jun 2009
50,000
70,000
90,000
110,000
130,000
150,000

Jul 2009 – Feb 2010
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
160,000

Table A.2: Compensation Plan – Maintenance Points
% loan amount in
good standing
< 90%
90.1% - 91.7%
91.71% - 93.25%
93.26% - 95.85%
95.86% - 96.37%
96.38% - 96.89%
96.9% - 97.4%
97.41% - 97.9%

25

Maintenance
Point
0
0.5
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85

% loan amount in
good standing
97.91% - 99.49%
99.5% - 100%
100.1% - 100.5%
100.51% - 101%
101.1% - 101.5%
101.51% - 102.5%
102.6% - 103%
103.1% -

Acquisition Point (A) is the amount of acquired loans divided by Acquisition Goal.
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Maintenance
Point
0.9
1
1.05
1.08
1.1
1.15
1.2
1.25

Figure 1. The number of transfers

Figure 2. Profit under High vs. Low Retention Pressure
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